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NOTES
MANDATORY RECORDING OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY LEASES IN SOUTH CAROLINA:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE SOUTH
CAROLINA BAILMENT STATUTE AS
AFFECTED BY U.C.C. ARTICLE NINE
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades the lease has dramatically ex-
panded into a major commercial transaction within the United
States. Inflation, recession, high interest rates, and rapidly ad-
vancing technologies are causing record numbers of potential
buyers to turn to leasing as an alternative to purchasing personal
property. Five years ago, estimates placed the value of leased
goods at over ten billion dollars with the following proportions of
new equipment being leased: 70% of all computers, 30% of all
passenger cars, 60% of all office equipment, 50% of all railroad
cars, 25% of all aircraft, 15% of all ships, and 10% of all machinery
and furniture and fixtures.' Since that time, the leasing industry
has grown to an estimated one hundred billion dollars and contin-
ues to grow at a rate of 10% to 12% ever year.2
While the lease has been a boon to the lessee, it has created
certain problems for the lessee's creditors and those who purchase
from the lessee. The lease passes only the right to use the prop-
erty; no ownership rights are acquired by the lessee. Yet, while
in possession of the property, the lessee has apparent ownership
of the property that can easily mislead a creditor into relying on
that property for security, or induce an innocent purchaser to buy
that property. In response to situations in which the apparent
ownership of property by a person who merely holds a possessory
interest can mislead third parties, a theory of ostensible or re-
1. Coogan, Leases of Equipment and Some Other Unconventional Security Devices:
An Analysis of UCC Section 1-201(37) and Article 9, 1973 DUKE L.J. 909, 912 n.4 (citing
VALUE LANE INVESTMENT SURVEY, Oct. 12, 1973 at 227 and Bus. WEEK, Sept. 4, 1971 at 42).
2. Colasanti, Considering Capital Leasing When Making the "Big" Buy, 15 DATA
MANAGEMENT 32, 36 (May 1977). For additional statistics on the size of the leasing indus-
try, see Wajnert, Leasing Gains Edge for Many Big Buys, 80 PURCHASING 79 (March 30,
1976); Romans, Why Leasing Is Becoming So Popular, 63 NATION'S BUSINESS 74 (June
1975).
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puted ownership has evolved that renders this property subject
to the debts of the ostensible owner.
This doctrine of ostensible ownership had its beginnings in
the English Bankruptcy Act, as amended in 1623, 3 which pro-
vided that if a person became bankrupt, any property not owned
by him but left in his possession by the true owner would be
included as part of the bankrupt's estate in settling the accounts
of his creditors. The true owner was barred from asserting his title
in seeking to reclaim his property.4 While not completely emulat-
ing their English counterparts, the bankruptcy statutes of the
United States achieve a comparable result through the voidable
preference powers.' These provisions endow the trustee in bank-
ruptcy with all of the rights and powers of a creditor who has
acquired a judicial lien as of the time of initiation of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Through the doctrine of estoppel, which
arises out of a presumption that creditors relied on the debtor's
ostensible ownership,' the lien-creditor status permits the trustee
to avoid hidden ownership inerests. South Carolina courts have
recognized that creditors "are legally presumed to give credit on
the faith of the property in their debtor's possession."'
In response to this estoppel doctrine, which is based on the
reputed ownership of the debtor in possession, recording statutes
have been widely adopted within the United States. Founded on
the theory that the record rebuts the potentially fraudulent mis-
representation created by apparent ownership, these statutes
enable the true owner to protect his interest in the property by
3. If at any time hereafter any person or persons shall become bankrupt,
and at such time as they shall so become bankrupt shall by the consent and
permission of the true owner and proprietary have in their possession, order and
disposition, any goods or chattels, whereof they shall be reputed owners, and
take upon them the sale, alteration or disposition as owners, that in every such
case the said commissioners or the greater part of them shall have power to sell
and dispose the same, to and for the benefit of the creditors which shall seek
relief by the said commission, as fully as any other part of the estate of the
bankrupt.
21 Jac. I, c. 19, § 11 (1623) reprinted in 1. G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND
PREFERENCES § 342 (rev. ed. 1940).
4. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 3, at § 342.
5. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2596 (1978) (to be
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 544). This Act takes effect on Oct. 1, 1979; this section will replace
the present § 70(c)(3) of the Bankruptcy Act at 11 U.S.C. § 110.
6. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 3 at § 343, p. 596. See also Casey v. Cavorac, 96 U.S. 467,
490 (1877) ("if the debtor remains in possession, the law presumes that those who deal
with him do so on the faith of his being the unqualified owner of the goods."); Robinson
v. Elliott, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 513 (1873) ("men get credit for what they apparently own
and possess . . . .").
7. Brock v. Bowman, 9 S.C. Eq. (1 Rich. Eq.) 185 (1832).
[Vol. 30
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PERSONAL PROPERTY LEASES
providing the potential creditor or purchaser with notice of the
true status of the property in question."
The South Carolina Code of Laws contains two recording
statutes affecting leases, section 30-7-10-and section 27-23-80.
Section 30-7-10 requires in part that all deeds of real property, all
leases of real property with a duration of over one year, and all
mortgages of both real and personal property must be recorded
in the office of the register of mesne conveyances or clerk of court
or in the office of the Secretary of State Section 27-23-80, the
bailment statute, applies to any agreement between the vendor
and the vendee or the bailor and bailee of personal property by
which the vendor or bailor reserves an interest in the property.
These agreements must be recorded in the manner prescribed for
the recording of mortgages."0
The most significant aspect of the bailment statute is that
true leases of personal property are included within its scope." It
is the intent of this note to explore the application of the bailment
statute to true leases in South Carolina, study the effects of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) on this statute, and evaluate
certain proposed alternatives to the current recording require-
ments.
I. SOUTH CAROLINA'S BAILMENT STATUTE
The South Carolina bailment statute reads as follows:
Every agreement between the vendor and vendee or the
bailor and bailee of personal property whereby the vendor or
bailor shall reserve to himself any interest in the property shall
be null and void as to subsequent creditors (whether lien credi-
tors or simple contract creditors) or purchasers for a valuable
consideration without notice unless such agreement be reduced
to writing and recorded in the manner provided by law for the
recording of mortgages. In the case of a subsequent mortgage of
the property for valuable consideration without notice, the in-
strument evidencing such subseqent mortgage must be filed for
record in order for its holder to claim under this section as a
subsequent mortgagee for value without notice and the priority
shall be determined by the time of filing for record. But nothing
8. Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation, 31 COL. L. REv. 617, 622-23 (1931).
9. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 30-7-10 (1976).
10. Id. § 27-23-80.
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herein contained shall apply to livery stable keepers, inkeepers
or other persons letting or hiring property for temporary use or
for agricultural purposes or depositing such property for the
purpose of repairs or work or labor done thereon or as a pledge
or collateral to a loan.' 2
The South Carolina bailment statute has a long legislative
history that dates back to 1843.'3 The underlying purpose of the
statute is to prevent the apparent ownership of the person in
possession of personal property from misleading his bona fide
creditors or purchasers. Its main thrust is to prevent the secret
lien and estop the true owner, whether a vendor or bailor, from
setting up his title in derogation of the rights of the deceived
creditor or purchaser." Viewing this statute in light of its com-
panion mortgage recordation statute'5 prompted one court to de-
clare that "[lt would be difficult to frame a statute expressing
more clearly and broadly than the South Carolina statutes.ex-
press the intention to sweep away all secret liens, and claims set
up under them against subsequent creditors."'" Accordingly, the
courts have faithfully followed the statute's mandate that
"[elvery agreement . . . whereby the vendor or bailor shall re-
serve to himself any interest in the property" must be recorded
or declared null and void for subsequent creditors or purchasers
for value without notice. 7 Subsequent creditors and purchasers
have avoided unrecorded chattel mortgages"5 and conditional
sales contracts 9 because of the bailment statute. Most impor-
tantly, however, unrecorded "bailments" have also fallen prey to
the statute's requirements."
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-80 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the bailment statute].
See, e.g., Carrol v. Cash Mills, 125 S.C. 332, 346, 118 S.E. 290, 294 (1923) ("commonly
referred to as the Bailment Act").
13. For legislative history and annotations, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-80 (1976).
14. Andrews v. Hurst, 163 S.C. 86, 92, 161 S.E. 331, 334 (1931); Carroll v. Cash Mills,
125 S.C. 332, 348-49, 118 S.E. 290, 295 (1923).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-7-10 (1976) and text accompanying note 9 supra.
16. Industrial Finance Corp. v. Cappleman, 284 F. 8, 11 (4th Cir. 1922).
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-80 (1976).
18. Tyson v. National Discount Corp., 149 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.S.C. 1957); Wardlaw
v. Troy Oil Mill, 74 S.C. 368, 54 S.E. 658 (1906).
19. Townsend v. Ashepoo Fertilizer Co., 212 F. 97 (4th Cir. 1914); Tyson v. National
Discount Corp., 149 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.S.C. 1957); In re M.L.B. Sturkey Co., Inc., 224 F.
251 (W.D.S.C. 1915); Armour & Co. v. Ross, 75 S.C. 201, 55 S.E. 315 (1906).
20. Industrial Finance Corp. v. Cappleman, 284 F. 8 (4th Cir. 1922); Townsend v.
Ashepoo Fertilizer Co., 212 F. 97 (4th Cir. 1914); In re Smith, 48 F. Supp. 866 (E.D.S.C.
1943); In re Tansill, 17 F.2d 413 (W.D.S.C. 1922); Stephens v. Hndricks, 228 S.C. 458, 90
S.E.2d 632 (1955); Andrews v. Hurst, 163 S.C. 86, 161 S.E. 331 (1931).
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Since "a bailment is a delivery of a thing in trust for some
special object or purpose, and upon a contract, express or im-
plied, to conform to the object or purpose of the trust,"' the term
"bailment" contains within its scope "a hiring of a thing for use,"
which is merely a bailment for a reward or compensation." There-
fore, a lease of personal property in South Carolina is directly
within the purview of the bailment statute as an agreement be-
tween a bailor and a bailee. If unrecorded, a lease will be declared
null and void as against subsequent creditors or purchasers?13
A party who invokes the application of the bailment statute
to a particular agreement must qualify within one of the three
expressly protected groups: lien creditors, simple contract credi-
tors, or purchasers for a valuable consideration. 4 Within these
protected groups the courts have included trustees in bank-
ruptcy,?- the State when enforcing tax liens,26 landlords,2 and
even lessees of real property. Further statutory analysis reveals
that all of these protected creditors or purchasers must be subse-
quent to and without notice of the agreement in question.
2
1
Whether the creditor is required to have actually relied on the
ostensible ownership is a matter upon which the courts have vac-
illated."
This conflict arises from seemingly inconsistent holdings by
the South Carolina Supreme Court. Early in the history of the
21. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAiLMENTS, 4 (5th ed. 1851).
22. Id. at 10-11.
23. Ludden & Bates Southern Music House v. Dusenberry, 27 S.C. 464, 4 S.E. 60
(1887).
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-80 (1976).
25. Tyson v. National Discount Corp., 149 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.S.C. 1957); In re Smith,
48 F. Supp. 866 (E.D.S.C. 1943); In re Tansill, 17 F.2d 413 (W.D.S.C. 1922); In re M.L.B.
Sturkey Co., Inc., 224 F. 251 (W.D.S.C. 1915); Townsend v. Ashepoo Fertilizer Co., 212
F. 97 (4th Cir. 1914).
26. Stephens v. Hendricks, 228 S.C. 458, 90 S.E.2d 632 (1955); Andrews v. Hurst, 163
S.C. 86, 161 S.E. 331 (1931).
27. Fidelity Trust & Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 158 S.C. 400, 155 S.E. 622 (1930) (the
court observed, however, that a landlord may only distrain if the tenant owned the prop-
erty in his own right, which was a question for the jury).
28. Ruffv. Columbia Railway, Gas and Electric Co., 109 S.C. 312,96 S.E. 183 (1918)
(this court declared that a lease for a term of years is sufficient to qualify as a purchase
for the purpose of the bailment statute).
29. See id. See also In re Tansill, 17 F.2d 413, 416-17 (W.D.S.C. 1922) (analysis of
the requirement that creditors or purchasers be subsequent); Stephens v. Hendricks, 228
S.C. 458, 461, 90 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1955).
30. Means, The Recording of Land Titles in South Carolina (Herein of Bona Fide
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bailment statute, the court declared in Wardlaw v. Troy Oil Mill:
that reliance was not a necessary element in defeating an unre-
corded agreement.32 The only requirements are that the creditor
be a subsequent creditor without notice of the agreement.Y In two
later cases, however, the court stated that a creditor must have
relied on the apparent possession or ownership of the debtor.31 An
examination of the facts of these two cases reveals that the credi-
tor's claim arose prior to the debtor's receipt of the goods. Al-
though couching its opinion in terms of reliance, the court was
apparently concerned with whether the creditor's interest arose
after the bailment. Admittedly, the court used the terms
"creditors, who have relied"3; however, the theory seems to rest
on the requirement of being "subsequent." In a more recent deci-
sion,3" the court reverted to the requirements of Wardlaw and
held that a landlord, as a subsequent creditor, could avoid any
unrecorded agreement "even though credit was not extended. on
the faith of the property in question.""7 This history, coupled with
the court decisions allowing trustees in bankruptcy and the State
(neither of which rely on any property when the hypothetical
credit is extended) to avoid unrecorded agreements,38 fully indi-
cates that reliance on the property is not a requisite to invoking
the bailment statute. Rather, as stated in Wardlaw:
[piroof that a subsequent creditor did not even know of the
existence of the property covered by an unrecorded mortgage
would not avail the mortgagee, for the reason that the statute
makes no such exception in the protection afforded to subse-
quent creditors without notice. Secret liens ought not to be fa-
vored, and we are not inclined to indulge in any attempts at
refinement in the interpretation of the statute in order to protect
those who from their design or negligence fail to record their
31. 74 S.C. 368, 54 S.E. 658 (1906).
32. Id. at 372-73, 54 S.E. at 659-60.
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-80 (1976).
34. Finance Corp. of America v. McGhee, 142 S.C. 380, 140 S.E. 691 (1927); Carroll
v. Cash Mills, 125 S.C. 332, 118 S.E. 290 (1923).
35. Carroll v. Cash Mills, 125 S.C. 332, 341, 118 S.E. 290, 292 (1923).
36. Fidelity Trust & Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 158 S.C. 400, 155 S.E. 622 (1930).
37. Id. at 409, 155 S.E. at 626.
38. For cases concerning a trustee in bankruptcy, see Townsend v. Ashepoo Fertilizer
Co., 212 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1914); Tyson v. National Discount Corp., 149 F. Supp. 592
(E.D.S.C. 1957); In re Smith, 48 F. Supp. 866 (E.D.S.C. 1943); In re Tansill, 17 F.2d 413
(W.D.S.C. 1922); In re M.L.B. Sturkey Co., Inc., 224 F. 251 (W.D.S.C. 1915). For cases
concerning the state as a tax-lien creditor, see Stephens v. Hendricks, 228 S.C. 458, 90
S.E.2d 632 (1955); Andrews v. Hurst, 163 S.C. 86, 161 S.E. 331 (1931).
[Vol. 30
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papers and then when disaster comes set them up against subse-
quent unsecured creditors."
To complete the examination of the scope of the bailment
statute, it is necessary to investigate the exceptions to its require-
ments. Of those enumerated in the last sentence of the statute,
the exceptions covering livery stable keepers, inkeepers, hiring for
agricultural purposes and depositing for repair, work, or as a
pledge or collateral for a loan are all self-explanatory and no
litigation of consequence has evolved out of them. The lone ex-
ception that has caused problems and is important to any study
of true leases in South Carolina is that which exempts "persons
letting or hiring property for temporary use."4
Inherent in any personal property leasing situation is the
determination of whether the nature of the lease requires record-
ing. If the arrangement is merely for the temporary use of the
property it is not subject to the bailment statute. The few cases
in which the phrase "temporary use" was considered present only
a rough approximation of the meaning of the term. It has been
held that a nine-month lease of an organ was nontemporary in
nature and thus within the recordation mandates of the bailment
statute.4' In later decisions, however, it was held that the consign-
ment of cloth as samples4 2 and the renting of a car for ten dollars
per week for an indefinite duration 3 were temporary uses exempt
from filing. The best analysis of the term "temporary use" came
in Gulf Refining Co. v. McCanless,1" in which the South Carolina
Supreme Court was faced with a one dollar annual rental agree-
ment covering gas storage tanks and lines. The court observed
that:
[iun order properly to construe the words "nothing herein con-
tained shall apply to any persons renting or hiring property for
temporary use," it is necessary for us to ascertain the intention
of the statute. Its primary purpose, unquestionably, was the
protection of subsequent creditors and purchasers for valuable
consideration without notice. Therefore the word "temporary"
was not used in contradistinction to the word "permanent," for
39. Wardlaw v. Troy Oil Mill, 74 S.C. 368, 372-73, 54 S.E. 658, 660 (1906).
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-80 (1976).
41. Ludden & Bates Southern Music House v. Dusenberry, 27 S.C. 464, 4 S.E. 60
(1887).
42. In re Nachman, 212 F. 460 (E.D.S.C. 1914).
43. Dodd v. Edwards, 172 S.C. 213, 173 S.E. 633 (1934).
44. 118 S.C. 6, 109 S.E. 801 (1921).
1979]
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any definite period of time, but to indicate such length of time
as is not reasonably calculated to mislead subsequent creditors
and purchasers into the belief that the person in possession of
the property is the owner thereof. '5
Although this interpretation does not set out a clear and easily
applied length-of-time test, it adequately reflects the spirit of the
bailment statute. Certainly any lessor who believes that his lease
might traverse the line from "temporary" into "misleading"
would be wise to record that lease." It would be appropriate,
nevertheless, to establish a more definite test to determine
whether a proposed lease is temporary. For example, a temporary
lease could be defined as any lease for a period less than one year.
This period of time has already been applied to loans of real
estate to require such leases for a period of twelve months or more
to be recorded."
Il. THE EFFECT OF THE ADOPTION OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE"
The enactment of the UCC into law by forty-nine states, the
District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands," accomplished a
major overhaul and unification of commercial law in this country.
In South Carolina the adoption of the UCC, particularly Article
9, has had a major impact on the bailment statute.
The scope of Article 9 is set out in section 9-102 which estab-
lishes in pertinent part that
[T]his Article applies so far as concerns any personal property
and fixtures within the jurisdiction of this state
(a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is
intended to create a security interest in personal property
or fixtures including goods, documents, instruments, gen-
eral intangibles, chattel paper, accounts or contract rights;
45. Id. at 9, 109 S.E. at 802.
46. The dichotomy established by such a test is best illustrated by way of example.
As noted in Dodd v. Edwards, 172 S.C. 213, 173 S.E. 633 (1934), a daily car rental for an
indefinite duration is exempt from recording; however, a multiple-year car lease through
a financing institution or a car dealer would probably not be exempt. Likewise, hourly,
daily, or even weekly rental of equipment, such as from a rental shop, would be exempt,
but equipment leased for a year or more (or even close to a year as in Ludden & Bates
Southern Music House v. Dusenberry, 27 S.C. 464, 4 S.E. 60 (1887)) would probably not
be exempt.
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-7-10 (1976).
48. All references to the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as UCCi will
be to the 1962 official text unless indicated otherwise.
49. J. WHITE & P. SuMmEms, HANDBOOK ON THE UNFIORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1 (1972).
[Vol. 30
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The result of the passage of Article 9 into law is that a single form
of security interest is substituted for the plethora of devices that
existed prior to the UCC - for example, the pledge, the chattel
mortgage, and the conditional sales contract. To enhance the
comprehensive posture of the, UCC and to further its avowed
intent to unify commercial -law, South Carolina, when adopting
the UCC, included a general repealer section, which provides that
"[aill acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this act are hereby
repealed."50 Thus, when Article 9 of the UCC went into force in
this state on January 1, 1968, ' a serious blow was dealt to the
scope of the bailment statute.
Prior to the adoption of the UCC, personal property mort-
gages were recorded in the office of the register of mesne convey-
ances (R.M.C. Office) in the county where the owner of the prop-
erty resided if he resided within the state; but if he resided out-
side the state it was recorded in the county where the property
was located. If there was no R.M.C. Office, then the chattel mort-
gages were recorded in the office of the clerk of court of the appro-
priate county or in the office of the Secretary of State.2 The
bailment statute required that any agreement between vendor
and vendee or bailor and bailee be recorded in the same manner
as provided by law for mortgages.53
Under the UCC creditors protect their rights in collateral by
perfecting their security interests. Perfection establishes the
order of priority of the various claims against the property. 4 The
vehicle for perfecting a security interest, with a few exceptions,
5
is the filing of a UCC financing statement in the appropriate
office.56 In keeping with the preemptory nature of the UCC in all
situations incorporated within its scope, the bailment statute is
superseded by Article 9, whenever the bailment statute conflicts
with the application of Article 9 to security interests. A threshold
inquiry must be made, therefore, to determine what sorts of
agreements qualify as Article 9 security interests.
While section 9-102(1)(a) establishes that any transaction
intended to create a security interest is within the scope of Article
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-10-103 (1976).
51. Id. § 36-10-101.
52. Id. § 30-7-10.
53. Id. § 27-23-80.
54. See, e.g., id. §§ 36-9-301 through -306, 36-9-312 and 36-9-313. (The public notice
provisions of UCC Article 9 are basically found throughout Parts 3 and 4 of the Article).
55. See id. § 36-9-302.
56. See id. § 36-9-401.
1979]
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9, section 1-201(37) sets out a much more precise definition of a
"security interest."5 From a reading of both of these sections one
can discern that a security interest includes all of the pre-UCC
arrangements between vendor and vendee in which the vendor
retained an interest in the property conveyed, for example, chat-
tel mortgages and conditional sales contracts. The part of the
bailment statute that is applicable to vendor and vendee agree-
ments has therefore been effectively repealed by the adoption of
Article 9. Also repealed was the recording statute for mortgages
of personal property. " The status of the applicability of the bail-
ment statute to leases, however, is not so clear."9
Whether a lease is included within UCC Article 9 depends
upon whether the lease qualifies as a security interest. Article 9
expressly covers only leases that are intended as security.' This
limitation implies that all leases not intended as security-true
leases-are excluded from the scope of Article 9. The crucial de-
termination, therefore, is the classification of the lease as either
a security lease or a true lease. As a preliminary test, the UCC,
as enacted by South Carolina, provides that "[u]nless a lease or
consignment is intended as security, reservation of title thereun-
57. "Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures
which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The retention or reser-
vation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the
buyer ( § 36-2-401) is limited in effect to a reservation of a "security interest."
The term also includes an interest of a buyer of accounts, chattel paper or
contract rights which is subject to Chapter 9. The special property interest of a
buyer of goods on identification of such goods to a contract for sale under § 36-
2-401 is not a "security interest," but a buyer may also acquire a "security
interest" by complying with Chapter 9. Unless a lease or consignment is in-
tended as security, reservation of title thereunder is not a "security interest" but
a consignment is in any event subject to the provisions on consignment sales
(§ 36-2-326). Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by
the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does
not of itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement
that upon compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or
has the option to become the owner of the property for no additional considera-
tion or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended for secu-
rity.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(37).
58. Id. § 30-7-10 (1976).
59. As noted earlier in the text (see notes 21 and 22 and accompanying text supra),
bailments comprise a multitude of arrangements of which a lease is just one type. Cer-
tainly warehousing, consignments, trust receipts, and the like are all valid bailments, each
with a unique status under the UCC-bailment statute dichotomy. It is the intent and
scope of this writing, however, to examine the effects of the bailment statute on leases.
Consequently, the application of the UCC to leases will be the only inquiry into the
remaining validity of agreements between bailor and bailee.
60. UCC § 9-102(2).
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der is not a 'security interest' . . . ."" As a further guide to the
perplexed, the Code explains that:
Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by
the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to
purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended for secu-
rity, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the terms
of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become
the owners of the property for no additional consideration or for
a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended for
security.2
The resulting uncertainty created by these sketchy guidelines has
triggered a great deal of criticism by authors of both textbooks
and law review articlesA While the crux of the evaluation is
whether a security interest was intended by the parties, the tests
with which to ascertain this intent are neither complete nor uni-
fied.
The UCC supplies one clear test and one guiding inquiry to
aid in the evaluation of a purported lease. Under section 1-201(37)
if the lease provides for an automatic transfer of the title to the
goods for no consideration or only nominal consideration at the
termination of the lease period, the lease is one intended for secu-
rity and is within the purview of Article 9.64 Should the lease
contain an option to purchase upon conclusion of the lease, this
option does not of itself make the lease a security lease; however,
one can infer from section 1-201(37) that such a provision should
be considered in the classification of the lease.65 These aids of-
fered by the UCC have proved to be inadequate because of the
vagueness of such terms as "nominal consideration" and
"intended as security."6 This problem of classifying a lease as a
true lease or a security lease has caused consternation in the fields
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(37) (1976).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Claxton, Lease or Security Interest; A Classic Problem of Commercial
Law, 28 MERCER L. REV. 599 (1977); Coogan, Leases of Equipment and Some Other
Unconventional Security Devices: An Analysis of UCC Section 1-207(37) and Article 9,
1973 DUKE L.J. 909; Hawkland, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Equip-
ment Leasing, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 446; Peden, The Treatment of Equipment Leases As
Security Agreements Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 13 Wm. & MARY L. Rv. 110
(1971); Leary, Leasing and Other Techniques of Financing Equipment Under the UCC,
42 TEMPLE L.Q. 217 (1969); Stroh, Peripheral Security Interests-The Expanded Net of
Article 9, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 67 (1967).
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(37) (1976).
65. Id.
66. See authorities cited at note 63 supra.
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of accounting and taxation as well as in commercial law. Under
tax principles, rent payments are deductible as trade or business
expenses, but only when the lessee is acquiring neither title to nor
an equity in the leased property." Accountants must decide the
character of a lease to determine whether to list it as a liability
or an asset. To aid in their inquiries, the Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service and the Accounting Principles Board
have issued declarative rulings to aid their practitioners in resolv-
ing the security-true lease conflict. Revenue Ruling 55-540K of the
Commissioner and Opinion No. 5 of the Board" each focus to a
large degree on whether the terms of the lease cause the lessee to
build an equity in the goods, such as when a certain number of
payments are required, or when the lessee is required to purchase
the goods at the termination of the lease or when the lease term
matches the useful life of the goods and the lease payments ap-
proximate what purchase payments would be. These tests, how-
ever, often prove to be just as fruitless as the guidelines set forth
in section 1-201(37). The result is a very unsettled area in com-
mercial law.
This distinction between a security lease and a true lease is
of paramount importance to the lessor. If the lease is character-
ized as one intended for security, then all the requirements,
rights, and remedies of Article 9 attach to that lease; if the lease
is found to be a true lease, Article 9 does not apply and the lessor
is not bound by the UCC. The true lease-security lease distinction
also plays a major role in determining whether the South Carolina
bailment statute is applicable. Certainly, as with vendor-vendee
agreements, when the lease is a security lease within Article 9, the
bailment statute is no longer applicable. A true lease, however,
since it is not intended as security, falls outside the scope of
Article 9 and the bailment statute still applies since only those
acts in conflict with the UCC were repealed when South Carolina
enacted Article 9.76 A security lease, therefore, is to be recorded
according to the UCC requirements, while a true lease is to be
recorded pursuant to the bailment statute.7 1 This dichotomy pres-
ents the lessor with uncertainty in selecting the proper procedure
67. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(3) (1976).
68. 1955-2 CUm, BULL. 41-42, § 4.01.
69. Accounting Principals Board Op. No. 5, 2 CCH ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 6523
(1964).
70. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
71. For recognition of these observations see, e.g., In re Bazen, 425 F. Supp. 1184
(D.S.C. 1977), aff'd mem. 471 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1978); [1970-711 Op. Att'y Gen. 180.
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he must follow to protect his interest in the leased property.
As noted by the South Carolina Attorney General:
[wlhen 57-308 [section 27-23-80 (1976)] was last amended
in 1962, the Uniform Commercial Code had not been enacted in
this State. The words "recorded in the manner provided by law
for recording mortgages" had reference to sections 60-101
[section 30-7-101 (1976)] et seq., in effect at that time. Those
sections were repealed in 1966 to the extent that they provide
for recordation of chattel mortgages. Section 10.10-103, Code of
Laws of South Carolina (1962) (vol. 2A, 1966 added vol.)
[section 36-10-103 (1976)]. Since January 1, 1968, "the manner
provided by law for recording (chattel) mortgages," is the man-
ner provided in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code for
perfecting a security interest in chattels.
That change creates somewhat of a delimma [sic] in South
Carolina because Article 9 specifically excludes a true lease
agreement from its provisions [Sec. 10-9.102(2)] [section 36-
9-102(2) (1976)] because it does not create a "security interest"
[Sec. 10-1.201(37)] [section 36-1-201(37) (1976)]. Conse-
quently, the filing provisions of Article 9 (Sections 10.9-401
through 10.9-407) [sections 36-9-401 through -9-407 (1976]
clearly do not contemplate the filing of a financing statement
to protect the interest of a lessor."
In attempting to resolve this dilemma, the Attorney General fo-
cused on the underlying purposes of the recording requirements
of both the UCC and the bailment statute. Both are intended to
avoid the secret lien and to protect potential creditors and pur-
chasers from the pitfalls associated with the ostensible ownership
of the property by the party in possession. The Attorney General
stated in the opinion that this policy of the bailment statute
could be effectively continued through the UCC by the filing of
financing statements under Article 9 just as if the lease were a
chattel mortgage. To protect his proprietary interest, the owner
should only note on the financing statement itself that the state-
ment covered a true lease.
In a landmark case, In re Bazen,73 the Federal District Court
for South Carolina adopted the South Carolina Attorney Gen-
eral's solution to this anomaly. By complying with the UCC filing
procedures the lessor was held to have fulfilled the mandates of
the bailment statute. The district court reiterated that "[these
72. [1970-71] Op. Att'y Gen. 180, 181.
73. 425 F. Supp. 1184 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd mem., 471 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1978).
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acts of filing are in keeping with the purpose of Article 9 and the
Bailment Statute to give subsequent purchasers, or creditors,
notice of ownership of the personal property which may become
the subject of [a] sale or security transaction.""4
This resolution of the recording dilemmas of the bailment
statute establishes that the bailment statute must still be con-
fronted in South Carolina, at least when true leases are con-
cerned. The resolution offered by In re Bazen, however, does not
eliminate the more intricate predicaments created by the rela-
tionship between the UCC and the bailment statute.
III. PROBLEMS UNDER In re Bazen
A. Technical filing problems
Both the South Carolina Attorney General and the court in
In re Bazen indicated that the filing of a financing statement 75
pursuant to Article 9 is the correct way to comply with the bail-
ment statute. The problem with this approach is that it fails to
recognize that the UCC does not require the filing of a financing
statement to perfect every security interest.76 Two obvious excep-
tions to filing that are of importance to the bailment statute are
consumer goods and goods subject to a state certificate of title
law. Purchase money security interests in consumer goods are
completely exempted from filing requirements.7 Security inter-
ests in goods subject to a state certificate of title law, while not
subject to UCC filing requirements,8 are subject to the require-
ments of certificate of title laws that affect the recording of secu-
rity interests." The fundamental inquiry, therefore, is whether
the court in In re Bazen, when incorporating the UCC filing sys-
tem into the bailment statute, also intended to incorporate the
UCC's policies on what situations necessitate a filing and the
proper method by which to achieve that filing. In the alternative,
did the court intend that the filing of a UCC financing statement
was simply to serve as the vehicle with which to fulfill the require-
ments of the bailment statute? To illustrate this conflict, one
example of each type of filing exception will be examined.
74. Id. at 1186.
75. For the proper form of a financing statement, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-402
(1976).
76. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-302 (1976).
77. Id. § 36-9-302(1)(d).
78. Id. § 36-9-302(3)(b).
79. Id. § 36-9-302(4).
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In Ludden & Bates Southern Music House v. Dusenberry"'
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the lease of an organ
for use in the home 'for nine months was subject to the bailment
statute, and that since the lease had not been filed, the organ was
subject to claims of subsequent creditors or purchasers for value
without notice of the lease. After In re Bazen, the filing of a
financing statement pursuant to Article 9 would appear to be the
proper way for the lessor to protect his interest in the organ under
the bailment statute.8 Upon turning to the UCC for guidance in
the filing of the financing statement, however, the lessor is faced
with a serious dilemma. Under section 9-302(1)(d) of the UCC,
2
purchase money security interests in consumer goods are exempt
from the ordinary filing requirements. Article 9 defines
"consumer goods" as goods "used or bought for use primarily for
personal, family or household purposes." The organ in Ludden
was to be used in the home of the lessee and would easily qualify
under the Code as a consumer good. Would the lease be exempt
from filing under the Code? That would depend on whether the
lease would qualify as a "purchase money security interest."'"
Since it is only the purchase money security interest in consumer
goods that is exempted from filing, by implication all other secu-
rity interests in consumer goods must meet the filing require-
ments of Article 9. This implication is buttressed by UCC section
9-401(1)(a), which indicates the proper place for filing financing
statements for consumer goods."' Arguably, a purchase money
security interest under the UCC is concerned with advances by
the creditor that enable the debtor to acquire the goods. By anal-
ogy, a lease of consumer goods is of the same variety of interest
because it enables the lessee to acquire the use of the goods.
Under this analysis, if the court in In re Bazen intended to
80. 27 S.C. 464, 4 S.E. 60 (1887).
81. For reasons of simplicity and to facilitate the purpose of this illustration, it is
assumed that under UCC § 1-201(37) and all applicable tests, the lease involved is a true
lease and not one intended as security.
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-302(1)(d) (1976).
83. Id. § 36-9-109(1).
84. A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent
that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of
its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation
gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if
such value is in fact so used.
Id. § 36-9-107 (1976).
85. Id. § 36-9-401(1)(a).
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incorporate the UCC provisions that govern the situations in
which filing is necessary, the exemption of purchase money secu-
rity interests from filing would also apply to leases of consumer
goods. On the other hand, if the court merely intended to adopt
the filing system of the UCC as a vehicle with which to satisfy
the bailment statute, the lessor would be required to file a financ-
ing statement in the appropriate place. 6
A corollary to the problem of filing consumer leases arises
from the special protection given to purchasers of consumer
goods. Section 9-307(2) of the UCC provides that a buyer of a
consumer good takes free of even a perfected security interest,
provided that he buys the good for value and without knowledge
of the security interest, unless the secured party has filed a fi-
nancing statement covering the goods. 7 If UCC policies were in-
corporated by In re Bazen, a lessor who did not file financing
statements covering leased consumer goods, while being pro-
tected against subsequent creditors by automatic perfection,",
would not be protected against subsequent purchasers for value
without notice. Such an inconsistency would not only be confus-
ing, but would also alter drastically the long-standing protection
against claims by subsequent purchaser which the bailment stat-
ute affords those who record their lease agreements."5
The UCC makes a second exception to its filing requirements
when the security interest is in property subject to a state certifi-
cate of title statute that provides for either a central filing of the
security interest or the indication of the security interest upon the
86. The proper place to file ... when the collateral is . . . consumer goods
risi in the office of the register of mesne conveyances or the clerk of court in
the county of the debtor's residence or if the debtor is not a resident of this State
than in the office of the register of mesne conveyances or the clerk of court in
the county where the goods are kept . . . .Id. § 36-9-401(1)(a).
87. Id. § 36-9-307(2).
88. Id. § 36-9-302(1)(a).
89. An even stronger protection is afforded creditors by § 36-9-307(1), which provides
that
[al buyer in the ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of § 36-1-201) other
than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming opera-
tions takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though the
security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-307(1) (1976). The key requirement in this expansive protection
for purchasers of goods is that the purchase must be "in the ordinary course of business."
Id. As defined at id. § 36-1-201(9), this entails only purchasers "from a person engaged in
the business of selling goods of that kind." Id. § 36-1-201(9). It would be most unusual to
find anyone leasing from someone else the very goods that he is in the business of selling.
It is doubtful, therefore, that this special protection of § 36-9-307(1) would ever arise in a
sale by a lessee.
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certificate of title itself.9" In these situations the secured party
must register or file his security interest according to the man-
dates of the certificate of title statute9' and the ordinary UCC
filing requirements do not apply. South Carolina requires every
motor vehicle92 to have a certificate of title9" and all security inter-
ests in a vehicle to be recorded on that certificate of title.9" Thus,
another dilemma under the bailment statute emerges. Does the
lessor of a vehicle subject to state certificate of 'title laws file a
financing statement or does he merely indicate his interest on the
certificate of title?
In re Bazen presented the district court with just this sort of
certificate of title problem, but the court's opinion did little to
clarify the situation. In that case, one of the leased items under
attack for noncompliance with the bailment statute was a truck
with a concrete mixer attached. The court observed that
[tihe plaintiff has complied with the UCC filing procedure as
required by this construction of the bailment statute: the motor
vehicle is titled in the name of the plaintiff as required by § 10.9-
302 [section 36-9-302 (1976)] and the financing statements cov-
ering the loader and the truck were filed with § 10.9-401
[section 36-9-401 (1976)].15
Actually, the plaintiff had not only filed a financing statement
with the Secretary of State,96 but the plaintiff-lessor was also
designated as the lien holder on the certificate of title, which
listed the plaintiff-lessor as the owner. By endorsing both the
filing of the financing statement and the proper listings on the
certificate of title, the court's opinion therefore leaves unan-
swered the question of whether both filing and listing on the title
are required for compliance with the bailment statement, or
whether only one will be sufficient. Once again, the gravamen of
this inquiry revolves around the intent of the court when it incor-
porated the UCC filing requirements into the bailment statute.
If the court intended to incorporate the UCC exceptions and poli-
cies concerning filing, lessors would need only to record their
90. Id. § 36-9-302(3)(b).
91. Id. § 36-9-302(4).
92. Defined in id. § 56-19-10(17).
93. Id. § 56-19-210.
94. See id. § 56-19-610 through -710.
95. In re Bazen, 425 F. Supp. 1184, 1186 (D.S.C. 1977).
96. The office of the Secretary of State is the correct place to file a financing state-
ment covering equipment. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-401(1) (1976). For definition of
"equipment," see id. § 36-9-109(2).
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leases in compliance with the certificate of title law.97 This does
not seem appropriate for leases because the lessor is already the
titled owner of the vehicle. On the other hand, if the court in-
tended to incorporate merely the method of recording a financing
statement, lessors would need only to record financing statements
in the appropriate places" and indicate on those statements that
leases of property are concerned.
The court in In re Bazen failed to recognize these intricacies
and merely ratified the plaintiff's actions in the case. The di-
lemma, therefore, still exists: does the bailment statute now sim-
ply incorporate the UCC financing statement as merely the vehi-
cle through which one complies with the recordation require-
ments of the bailment statute, or does it also incorporate the
requirements of the UCC filing system, its exceptions, and the
idiosyncracies concerning the filing of financing statements?
One approach to a solution of this plight stems from a narrow
reading of the two statutes. The bailment statute, as tempered
by the UCC,99 expressly covers every true lease agreement and
requires that they be recorded as required by law for the recording
of mortgages. The statute then goes on to set out its own list of
exceptions to recording.' The bailment statute, therefore, de-
fines its own scope and does not need further delineation by or
incorporation of the scope provisions of the UCC. Since the UCC
now provides the method of recording security interests, includ-
ing those security interests formerly known as chattel mortgages,
a lessor should turn to the UCC to determine how and where to
record, and rely on the bailment statute to establish when record-
ing is necessary. Under this interpretation the UCC, along with
both the Attorney General's opinion and In re Bazen, provides
that the method of filing is fulfilled by the financing statement.
The place of filing is also prescribed by the UCC and is set out
in section 36-9-401 of the South Carolina Code of Laws. This
analysis produces the conclusion that all true leases not among
the enumerated exceptions are protected under the bailment
statute so long as a UCC financing statement is filed in the appro-
priate office, and that financing statement properly indicates
that it covers a lease.
97. See id. § 36-9-302(3) - (4), and §§ 56-19-610 to -710.
98. See note 96 supra.
99. See section II of text.
100. Viz., livery stable keepers, innkeepers, letting or hiring for temporary use or
agricultural purposes. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 27-23-80 (1976).
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An alternative approach is founded on the concept of uni-
formity of notice. By reference in the bailment statute to the
recording of agreements as required by law for recording mort-
gages, it can be inferred that the intent was to provide the credi-
tor with a uniform place to check or file any interests that are
required to be recorded. The creditor must only be familiar with
one set of recording requirements and must only examine one set
of books to ascertain the true and complete status of the property
in question. This uniform system of filing could be achieved in
the present day by subjecting the bailment statute completely to
the UCC's filing system. A creditor or purchaser would then need
to be cognizant of only one set of requirements.
Along with this ease of filing and checking rationale, an addi-
tional reason calls for a uniform recording requirement. As men-
tioned above,' 0 ' the UCC has caused great problems in determin-
ing whether a lease should be filed as a security interest under
Article 9. With the bailment statute's requirement that all leases
be recorded, a uniform filing requirement incorporating the UCC
would accomplish both ends: (1) filing would satisfy the bailment
statute if the transaction were a true lease; and (2) upon a later
finding that the lease was actually a security lease, the lessor
would still be protected since his recording complied with the
UCC and perfected his security interest. Under the former ap-
proach, the potentially separate filing requirements could require
double filing by the lessor. Either approach, however, is better
than the unresolved dilemma existing today.
B. Theoretical problems
Possible adverse consequences of requiring that UCC financ-
ing statements be filed for true leases in this state arise from the
plight of a lessor as he debates the issue of whether his lease is
one intended as security. 02 Not only are the UCC rights, require-
ments, and remedies at stake, but, more importantly, accounting
and tax benefits of true leases are also affected. The tax benefits
of a lease, such as investment tax credits and accelerated depre-
ciation, are enticing to the lessor.' 3 Likewise, the accounting ad-
101. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
102. For definition of security interest, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(37) (1976); see
also notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra.
103. See, Coogan, supra note 63, at 955 and n.123. See, e.g., T. CUNNANE, TAX ASPEcTS
OF BUYING AND LEASING BusINESS PROPERTY AND EQUIPMENT (1974); A. GOLDSTEIN, COMMER-
CIAL TRANSACTIONs DEs(K BOOK 121 (1977).
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vantages to the lessee concerning capital allocation and the avail-
ability of assets for security further support the use of leases when
available. 4 Quite often, both the lessee and the lessor desire the
transaction to be interpreted as a lease and not as a security
interest. The recording of a lease by filing a UCC financing state-
ment causes both parties to run the risk of having this action
construed as an indication, if not an admission, that the intent
of the transaction is not to create a lease, but a secured transac-
tion.
At least one court, when faced with a filed financing state-
ment by the lessor, decided that such a filing did indicate a
security interest. In In re Lakeshore Transit-Kenosha, Inc., 05 the
Wisconsin Federal District Court ruled as follows:
The strongest evidence that the document was intended as a
security agreement comes from the acts of the claimant itself.
A financing statement was filed in the office of the Secretary of
State and the Register of Deeds for Racine County. . . . At the
trial the principal witness for claimant, George Dopp, testified
that the notice was filed upon the recommendation of the legal
department of the B.F. Goodrich Company. This would indicate
to the court that the B.F. Goodrich Company intended the
agreement to be a security agreement. What other reason would
there be for filing it?ln6
If a similar result is reached in determining the nature of a lease
filed under South Carolina's bailment statute, a great hardship
would be imposed on lessors and lessees within the state, since
to comply with the mandates of the bailment statute would de-
stroy the advantages sought by the lease transaction.
The result reached in In re Lakeshore, however, should be
virtually impossible in South Carolina courts for three reasons.
The first and most important reason stems from a closer analysis
of In re Lakeshore itself. The pivotal aspect of that opinion was
a prior decision by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin that no provi-
sion existed under Wisconsin law calling for the filing of leases of
personal property. 07 Without this requirement, the court felt that
the only inference that could be drawn from the lessor's act of
filing was that the parties intended to create a securiy interest.
104. See Wyatt, Accounting for Leases, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 497. For general informa-
tion, see A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 103, at 20-21.
105. 7 UCC REP. 607 (E.D. Wisc. 1969).
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In South Carolina, however, the bailment statute requires a re-
cording of leases and In re Bazen indicates that a UCC financing
statement is the proper method of recordation. No adverse intent
should be read into a lessor's act of filing.
The second protection to the lessor derives from a proposed
revision to the UCC, presently not enacted in South Carolina.
The American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have proposed a new code
section, section 9-408, which will provide for permissive filing of
leases. The full text of this code section is as follows:
A consignor or lessor of goods may file a financing statement
using the terms "consignor", "consignee", "lessor", "lessee" or
the like instead of terms specified in Section 9-402. The provi-
sions of this Part shall apply as appropriate to such a financing
statement but its filing shall not of itself be a factor in determin-
ing whether or not the consignment or lease is intended as secu-
rity (Section 1-201(37)). However, if it is determined for other
reasons that the consignment or lease is so intended, a security
interest of the consignor or lessor which attaches to the con-
signed or leased goods is perfected by such filing.
The South Carolina Legislature is still considering all of the 1972
amendments to the UCC and section 9-408 is therefore not yet
law in this state. 08 Nevertheless, its principles, rationale, and
instructions should carry some weight in interpreting the require-
ment of filing a financing statement covering a true lease in South
Carolina.
The third reason that South Carolina courts will probably
avoid the In re Lakeshore result rests on a decision of the Georgia
Court of Appeals. In Rollins Communications, Inc. v. Georgia
Institute of Real Estate,0 1 UCC section 9-408 had not yet been
adopted in that jurisdiction and the lease agreement specifically
provided for the filing of a financing statement. The court, in
determining the effect of such a requirement, observed that due
to the varying, multiple, complex considerations involved in as-
108. At the present time, the 1972 Revisions along with the South Carolina Reporter's
comments are in the hands of the Commercial Law Committee of the South Carolina Bar.
These revisions should be presented to the legislature within the next year or two. For an
analysis of these revisions, see H. Haynsworth, IV Study of the 1972 Revisions to Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (March 1978) (unpublished report for the South
Carolina Legislature [hereinafter cited as H. Haynsworth, IV]. As of this writing the 1972
Revisions are still being studied and are not yet in the form of proposed legislation.
109. 140 Ga. App. 448, 231 S.E.2d 397 (1976).
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certaining whether a lease is a true lease or one intended for
security,
[it is our view that the lessor, faced with such uncer-
tainty, should be permitted to make provisions for precaution-
ary filing without the risk that such provisions would in and of
themselves, as urged in the instant appeal, convert the lease
into a secured transaction. The review committee for Article 9
proposed in a new § 9-408 that filing is not itself a factor in
determining whether a lease is intended as security. [Citation
omittedi. We so hold now.""
In light of the three foregoing considerations, it seems im-
probable that any court would consider the filing of a financing
statement under the mandates of the South Carolina bailment
statute and In re Bazen as evidence of intent to create a security
interest. No court should penalize a party for the performance of
an act required by law.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE BAILMENT STATUTE
With all of the problems elucidated in the foregoing section,
it would be wise to examine a few alternatives to the bailment
statute as applied to true leases in South Carolina. At the outset,
one must recall the motivation behind this statute in order to
properly evaluate the proposed alternatives.
The principle underlying the bailment statute is to afford
public notice of liens created under the ostensible ownership
doctrine and to prevent the lessor from asserting his claim
against subsequent creditors if he fails to record his interest in the
property. In a lease situation, the possession of the property by
the lessee could lead creditors and purchasers of the lessee to
believe that he had unencumbered ownership, therefore, inducing
an extension of credit or a purchase. To avoid injury to these
creditors and purchasers, the bailment statute requires the lessor
to provide public notice of the lack of ownership in the lessee by
recording the lease agreement.
This principle has recently come under attack. With the ad-
vancement of the vast accounting system in today's business
world, it is argued that devices such as the financial statement
and the balance sheet have replaced the need for recording acts
such as the bailment statute:
110. Id. at 451, 231 S.E.2d at 399.
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In the face of today's methods of granting credit-financial
statement analysis, credit agency report, et al.-ostensible own-
ership appears to be an antiquated doctrine and the presump-
tion that creditors extend credit on the faith of property in the
debtor's possession no longer represents the common experi-
ence. The Code's drafters should have considered this before
blindly incorporating such a dated theory into their "modern"
commercial code."'
While this observation may accurately portray the general
transactions of the business world, it underestimates the use of
recording statutes by creditors and purchasers alike. Not only
does a recording statute protect against the secret lien, it also
provides a quick, convenient place for creditors and purchasers
to look for assurance of the debtor's or seller's ownership interests
in the property. The requirements of a recording statute carry
along with them their own enforcement procedures by eliminat-
ing any interests reserved in property that are not recorded. This
seems to be far superior to and more appropriate in providing
notice of true ownership than would a financial statement pre-
pared by the ostensible owner, because the financial statement is
subject to "doctoring" by that ostensible owner.
The main error in this attack on recording acts is that rather
than eliminating the ostensible ownership doctrine, the suggested
reliance on accounting devices merely substitutes a new means to
the same end-protect subsequent creditors and purchasers from
the misleading nature of the apparent ownership of the possessor
of goods. Rather than turning to the recording act's requirements
this new proposal relies on the records of the debtor himself.
Certainly this is not much better than asking the debtor if the
property is his or not. It seems that this attack on the ostensible
ownership doctrine underlying all recording acts carries little
weight at all. In today's credit-based economy some form of no-
tice of secret liens is desirable. Recording acts, with their self-
enforcing sanctions on nonrecorded interests, are far superior to
the use of accounting statements of the parties. That these re-
cording acts are still necessary and accepted today is evidenced
by the various bankruptcy statutes and the widespread recent
adoption of the UCC and even more recently, the 1972 revisions
to the UCC. The recording requirements of the bailment statute
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in South Carolina, therefore, remains on sound theoretical under-
pinnings.
A possible alternative to our bailment statute lies within
suggested changes to the UCC. One commentator, William
Hawkland, has proposed that rather than retain the security
lease-true lease dichotomy, all leases of personal property should
be brought within the requirements of UCC Article 9.112 In deplor-
ing the omission of leases from the parameters of the UCC, Mr.
Hawkland notes that
[alt one stroke, therefore, a new law requiring leases to be filed
would solve the lessor's problems with the creditors of the lessee,
put purchasers and creditors of the lessee on notice with regard
to the ownership of the leased equipment, and enable the lessee
to enjoy presently available accounting and tax advantages
without his seriously imposing a meaningless no-filing restric-
tion on the lessor. '"
Other writers in this field have followed Mr. Hawkland's sugges-
tions but have attempted to limit the recording of leases under
the UCC to those leases that are "for a substantial term""' or that
exceed some prescribed term."''
Difficulties arise, however, in attempting to place true leases
within the confines of Article 9 of the UCC. These problems, as
elaborated upon by Peter Coogan," 6 grow out of the very nature
of a true lease. Since a true lease is really the sale of the use of
property, and in the usual case contemplates the return of the
property to the lessor at the conclusion of the lease, the various
remedy provisions set out in Part 5 of Article 9 are of little conse-
quence to true leases. The right of the secured party to repossess
and sell the collateral"7 is of no help to the lessor as he always
remains the true owner of the property. Likewise, the right of the
purchaser to redeem the collateral"' is equally inapplicable to the
lessee of a true lease because he has no ownership rights in the
property in the first place. These and other provisions of Part 5,
just as inappropriate to leases, would provide no remedial bene-
fits for lessees or lessors if all leases were included within Article
112. Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC-Part 5: Con-
signments and Equipment Leases, 77 CoM. L.J. 108, 114-15 (1972).
113. Id. at 114.
114. Leary, supra note 63 at 252.
115. Peden, supra note 63, at 158.
116. Coogan, supra note 63.
117. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-504 (1976).
118. Id. § 36-9-506.
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9. "If one takes out the heart of the security interest [the remedy
provisions], query as to whether the exercise of denominating a
security interest is worth the effort?""' Mr. Coogan does recog-
nize the need for some form of public notice requirement for
leases because of the tendency of a true lease to mislead creditors
or purchasers. But, Article 9 with its ineffective remedy provi-
sions does not conveniently incorporate leases within its bounds.
An additional alternative to the bailment statute has been
proposed by the South Carolina Reporter for the 1972 Amend-
ments to the UCC.21 To clear up the various inconsistencies and
conflicts between the UCC and the pre-UCC laws in South Caro-
lina, he suggests that the legislature enact a new, specific repealer
statute listing sixty-four different code sections that should be
repealed or modified. Such a repealer statute would avoid the
uncertainty of the general repealer statute enacted in 1966.121 One
of the sixty-four statutes he recommends to be repealed is the
bailment statute. 22 In justifying this proposed repeal of the bail-
ment statute, the Reporter relies on the various inconsistencies
between the statute and the UCC and the confusion created in
attempting to comply with the bailment statute through the UCC
and In re Bazen. 123 An additional justification for this repeal
would lie in the goal of cohesiveness and uniformity within the
UCC. The bailment statute of South Carolina serves as a trap for
unwary out-of-state lessors since this statute extends also to
leases executed outside of this state. 124 Because leases do not pro-
perly fit within the Code, an inclusion to the contrary would only
destroy that goal.
IV. CONCLUSION
The leasing of personal property has expanded into a major
commercial transaction within the last few years. For this reason
the lease needs to be subjected to various requirements in order
to ensure that it does not become a widely abused transaction.
Certainly the most dangerous aspect of a lease is its ability to
mislead creditors or purchasers into relying on the apparent own-
119. Coogan, supra note 63, at 960.
120. See H. Haynsworth, IV, supra note 108, at 283-87.
121. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-10-103 (1976).
122. H. Haynsworth, IV supra note 108, at 283-87 (the bailment statute is number
51 in the list of statutes he proposes to be repealed).
123. See id. at 287-90, 307-08 (S.C. Reporter's notes).
124. Sheldon v. Blauvelt, 29 S.C. 453, 7 S.E. 593 (1888). See Ludden & Bates South-
ern Music House v. Dusenberry, 27 S.C. 464, 4 S.E. 60 (1887).
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ership of the lessee in possession of the property. It was this
deceptive nature of a lease that motivated the legislature to in-
clude leases within the recording statutes of South Carolina. The
misleading character of secret liens is a major consideration of the
drafters of Article Nine, which has been adopted by forty-nine of
the fifty states. For it is the secret lien that the notice filing
requirements of Article 9 are aimed at eliminating. The lease is
no less misleading than the security interest. If anything, it is
more misleading because in the security interest the debtor has
some interest or equity in the goods. In the lease, the lessee has
no interest or equity in the goods.
The bailment statute, though severely limited by the UCC,
still applies to true leases in this state since the UCC excludes
true leases from its coverage. Although technical problems do
cause difficulties in the administration of the bailment statute,
all that is needed is a legislative explanation of the proper proce-
dure for complying with the statute's mandates. By redrafting the
bailment statute, the legislature could retain the vehicle for ef-
fecting the recognized desirability of public notice of the lease,
update the bailment statute's coverage by limiting its scope to
those areas not already preempted by the UCC, and provide for
the proper procedures for meeting its requirements.
This retention of a modified or updated bailment Statute is
preferrable to those available alternatives. To repeal the bailment
statute would be a violation of the established need for public
notice of leases or personal property. To incorporate all leases
within Article 9 of the UCC, on the other hand, would seem to
be overkill. Since the remedy provisions of Article 9 do not apply
to the lease situation, there seems no reason to include leases
within the UCC itself. Rather, it is the public notice established,
under a modified bailment statute by recording leases in keeping
with the appropriate UCC filing procedures that provides the
clearest, easiest, and most adequate method of complying with
the present day necessities of the commercial world.
By way of illustration, the new bailment statute could read
as follows:
(1) All leases, bailments'2" and any other agreement be-
tween the bailor and bailee of personal property for a longer
period than six months (either by its express terms or through
125. Bailments are left within the purview of this proposed statute since the effect of
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the exercise of a renewal option clause)' 26 whereby the bailor
shall reserve to himself any interest in the property shall be null
and void as to subsequent creditors (whether lien creditors or
simple contract creditors) or purchasers for a valuable consider-
ation without notice unless a financing statement properly indi-
cating the type of agreement involved is filed with the appropri-
ate office as listed in § 36-9-401 for the perfection of a security
interest in that property.
(2) But nothing herein contained shall apply to livery stable
keepers, innkeepers, property used for agricultural purposes,
property deposited for purposes of repair of work or labor done
thereon, or as a pledge or collateral to a loan.
(3) For purposes of this act, the "financing statement" shall
comply with the requirements of § 36-9-402.
This proposed statute adequately protects against the evils
of the secret lien by providing all potential creditors or purchasers
with notice of the true status of the property. By expressly utiliz-
ing the UCC financing statement and requiring filing with the
appropriate office under Article 9, three needs are served: first,
the technical In re Bazen problems of the present statute are
solved; second, both the potential creditor and the lessor himself
are provided with a central filing place for both Article 9 security
interests and leases under this new bailment statute; third, the
lessor, by filing, not only protects his lease under the bailment
statute, but these procedures also protect him should his lease be
ruled a security lease, because his original filing would comport
with Article 9 standards. Finally, by delineating a six-month test
to determine what leases to record, the vaguesness of the present
statute is eliminated. A workable bailment statute that requires
the recording of leases of personal property would be a great con-
tribution to commercial law.
Paul B. Zion
126. The six-month time limit is aimed at excluding trivial leases, such as the hourly
or daily rental of tools and other equipment, from the rigors of a recording requirement.
Although other tests to exclude trivial leases exist, such as a dollar amount test, the
length-of-time test seems to be the easiest, most accurate and most effective test.
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